Managing Disagreement: A Defense of “Regime Bias” by Andrew Sabl
SYMPOSIUM: MEASURING DEMOCRACY
Managing Disagreement: A Defense of “Regime Bias”
Andrew Sabl
Published online: 24 November 2010
# The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Stein Ringen’s theory of democratic purpose
cannot do the work expected of it. Ringen’s own criteria
oscillate between being too vague to be useful (i.e. “freedom”)
or, when specified more fully, conflicting, so that almost all
democracies will seem to be potentially at cross-purposes with
themselves rather than their purposes or sub-purposes being
mutually reinforcing. This reflects a bigger and more
theoretical problem. Disagreement about the purpose of
democracy is built into democracy itself. The whole point of
many (perhaps all) of our democratic institutions is to arrive at
conditionally legitimate decisions in spite of such disagree-
ment. So-called regime bias, i.e. the tendency to assess
democracies according to the form and stability of their
institutions rather than their results or their ability to serve
certain purposes, does not in fact arise from bias. It arises on
the contrary from a determination to avoid the bias inherent in
giving some—inevitably partisan—ideals of what democra-
cies should do pride of place over others in a scheme of
measurement or evaluation. And even a regime-based
definition of democracy must itself make simplifying assump-
tions that elide possible normative controversies over how the
democratic game is best played. Vindicating one’s preferred
set of democratic ideals against alternatives is a completely
legitimate enterprise and lends richness to debates within and
across democracies. But it is an inherently ideological and
political enterprise, not a neutral or scholarly one.
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This response is necessarily based on only Professor
Ringen’s current piece, not his book. The essay he presents
here promises an array of methodological and substantive
innovations—a theory of democratic potential, a theory of
democratic purpose, and a theory of measurement—whose
elaboration no doubt makes up much of the book but must
defy proper summary in an article. Here I will focus on
only one question: whether a theory of democratic purpose
can do the work that Ringen demands of it. I admit to some
skepticism, a skepticism grounded in both the specific
criteria he puts forth and the general theoretical problems
with seeking objective measures of some of our most
contested political concepts.
The claim that “consolidated democracies differ widely
in the quality of democracy” is not itself new, nor presented
as new in Ringen’s piece. Which polity or polities are the
proper models of good government, the proper objects of
political aspiration, has inspired political debate ever since
human beings divided themselves into distinct formal
governments. And it has inspired philosophical debate for
as long as there has been philosophy. Ringen’s innovation
is the claim to have settled this question. He has been able
to “analyze democracy according to its purpose,” and
thereby to reach an objective “yardstick for the measure-
ment of democratic quality.” The task then is to evaluate the
yardstick: to see whether it runs in a straight line and which
units of measurement it uses, and to judge whether a
yardstick designed as proposed is in fact a useful tool.
I am sympathetic to Ringen’s methodological individu-
alism—though applying it in the current case may ignore
the possibility that some praiseworthy political achieve-
ments are collective. Such collective achievements might
vary, for instance, with a country’s size, either positively (a
nation’s ability to defend its interests, the scope of
intellectual and cultural life in a common and native
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language) or negatively (social cohesion, easy mutual
understanding and trust among citizens, a sense of personal
efficacy). Perhaps such things, or other collective goods,
can be measured on the individual level by asking
individual respondents whether they think they have them
—a rough proxy but not necessarily a bad one. That aside:
assuming that the purpose of a democracy is to serve “the
good of the [individual] persons who live under its
governance,” in what does that good consist?
If we mean to construct a usable yardstick, that good
must either be a single thing, or, more leniently, a group of
things that move in the same broad direction or at least do
not conflict with one another. In different places in this
piece, Ringen seems to propose both of these alternatives.
He names the single criterion by which we may judge
democracies to be “the freedom of the common man” (and,
one assumes, the common woman and child). However, the
way he unpacks freedom implicates, depending on how one
counts them, at least seven different dimensions or values
other than freedom: (1) autonomy; (2) security; (3-4)
people’s ability to “reasonably get on with their lives as
they wish” (let us count this as two values, the satisfaction
of reason and of life-plans, though unless one makes the
term “reasonably” do a great deal of work, it could in
theory imply as many values as there are citizens multiplied
by wishes); (5) living as one’s own master in the future,
which seems distinct from “autonomy” in the present; (6)
having one’s children, which presumably includes all
descendants, live as their own masters in the future; finally
(7) “welfare for persons,” which, if it has a substantial and
independent meaning, would seem to require something
beyond any value already mentioned.
Even limiting ourselves to these seven dimensions
requires conservative assumptions. We must assume that
the indicators Ringen lists (ranging from “trust in govern-
ment” to “citizens’ security of human capital”) are indeed
instruments for measuring the above values, rather than
disguised values in themselves. More broadly, the claim
that each democracy succeeds to the extent that it promotes
freedom for its own citizens brackets the possibility that
democracies have legitimate purposes beyond their borders,
however understood: foreign aid; protecting the global
environment; promoting human rights; or safeguarding
allies, treaty obligations, or regional and global institutions
that aim at preventing war. But again for argument, let us
take the above values as all that count.
There are now two ways to proceed. First, we can
entertain the thesis that all of the above are really measuring
only freedom, and that the right kind of analysis can
determine how to measure that. Charity requires that we not
take this to be Ringen’s intended point. Freedom is perhaps
the most controversial and ideology-laden concept in all of
political theory. It is not just that books written by first-rate
thinkers in defense of very different conceptions of freedom
could fill a library. Books written by first-rate thinkers that
demonstrate conclusively, from every perspective from the
Rawlsian to the Wittgensteinian to the sociological to the
postmodern, that freedom is an inherently controversial and
ideology-laden concept, not something whose meaning can
be determined through analysis, could fill a good sized-
library shelf.
One shorter work can serve as illustration. Isaiah Berlin
in “Two Concepts of Liberty” pointed out long ago that a
“negative” conception of freedom that defines it as the
absence of outside interference and a “positive” conception
that defines it as self-mastery or self-government each
represents a persistent and coherent tradition in political
thought—and that these traditions directly conflict with
each other in both theory and practice. It is true that many
thinkers since Berlin, and of course before him, have
claimed success in combining the two. But many more
have claimed that the conflict is real, and that the “true
sense” of liberty or freedom is either the negative one or the
positive one (or else that both are legitimate, each capturing
part of the concept or else embodying a legitimate but
partisan view of the concept). Ringen’s book probably does
not contain, in addition to a series of innovations in social-
science methods, a philosophical demonstration that this
entire literature is wrongheaded, that the millions who have
used freedom in divergent ways are all, except one,
conclusively mistaken. Failing that, we must try to save
the yardstick the other way: by saying that the proper
measure of democracy consists not of one thing but of
many.
Doing that would mean claiming either (1) that the seven
dimensions or values listed above are synonymous or (2,
and more likely) that over time and in general they are
mutually reinforcing, so that substantial progress with
respect to one will tend to produce progress with respect
to some of the others and does not in any sustained way
entail substantial regress with respect to any of the others.
Only then could all of these dimensions be said to reflect a
single “purpose” of democracy, which is the monist task
that Ringen has set himself. (He could have instead spoken
of a plurality of potentially conflicting purposes, but then
the question of how to weigh them would become acute,
and again a matter not of analysis but of ideology and
politics. As Jeremy Waldron has pointed out, how to weigh
things generally agreed to be good but competing is the
typical and pervasive subject matter of all politics.) We
could then call that purpose “freedom” for convenience, in
the knowledge that this was meant as shorthand rather than
analysis.
Now we can, by listing pairwise combinations, test the
plausibility of the necessary claim. The theory of demo-
cratic purpose now succeeds if and only if autonomy never
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(seriously) conflicts with security; welfare never seriously
conflicts with living as one’s own master; maximizing our
descendants’ chances for self-mastery never seriously
conflicts with our security, welfare, autonomy, or a desire
to live as we wish in the present; and all people’s
reasonable life-plans can be accommodated at once, again
assuming non-tendentious readings of “reasonable”—and
so on, pairing each dimension with all others. Once again,
the argument that all these good things can go together is
respectable, and thinkers as sophisticated as Hegel, Marx,
and even Mill, on some readings, have made it. But it is more
credible to say, once we view things concretely, that the above
values are what interpreters of Berlin have called “plural” or
“plural and conflicting”: not only different but incommensu-
rable, not reducible to a single yardstick. As Berlin argued,
there exists—objectively and everywhere, not as a matter of
temporary confusion or faction—a “variety of basic human
needs,” not one, and “everything is what it is: liberty is
liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human
happiness or a quiet conscience.”
From this pluralist thesis Berlin draws the conclusion
that we should value individual choice, since different
people will rank these goods or needs differently. On the
level of politics we may draw another conclusion: that the
only conceivable way of ranking democracies is precisely
by using “regime” criteria, by measuring not the substance
of government policies but the procedures that translate
citizen’s values and wishes into policy. Any ordered
government by definition possesses durable and regular,
though perhaps informal, norms of resolving conflicts
peacefully in the absence of substantive agreement on what
is to be done. A democratic government requires that these
norms in some sense (and the details are hotly disputed) track,
reflect, be responsive to, or be acceptable to the wishes of
most citizens in a system in which each counts equally.
That much is neither controversial nor trivial. Many of the
world’s governments clearly fall short in some of these
respects. Some are quasi-anarchic, failing to enforce laws and
policies in the face of powerful actors’ opposition. Others are
what Robert Dahl called “dual.” They are democratic with
respect to the wishes and aspirations of one ethnic or cultural
group but openly dismissive of—and to that extent tyrannical
with respect to—another. Still others are not fully democratic
but rather oligarchic, giving a privileged few an influence over
democratic decisions that is denied to the rest.
With respect to oligarchy, it seems correct that some
version of what Ringen calls “protection of democratic
processes from transgression by economic power” is what
he says it is: a proper and indisputable criterion for
evaluating any democracy. The most ancient and most
minimal definition of a democracy is non-oligarchy, the
absence of a privileged class whose members permanently
command more power than other citizens. We should all be
worried by Larry Bartels’ methodologically rigorous find-
ing (qualitatively supported by the work of other scholars,
including Martin Gilens, Benjamin Page, and Jeffrey
Winters) that U.S. senators in the period he studied were
half again as responsive to the ideological beliefs of the top
third of their constituents, in terms of income, than to the
middle third, and that senators gave the bottom third “no
weight at all” in their voting decisions. Bartels’ summary
descriptions of the Senate corresponds—consciously; he
cites Aristotle—to a fairly literal definition of oligarchy.
The Senate in his view comes “a good deal closer to equal
representation of incomes than to equal representation of
citizens” (emphasis in original), and “the data are consistent
with the hypothesis that senators represented their cam-
paign contributors to the exclusion of other constituents.”
Returning to the main point: a democratic order requires
durable, regular norms of conflict resolution and must roughly
and generally track citizens’ wishes on the basis of civic
equality. Democratic theory cannot, if its practitioners are
honest, settle more than that. Any position we take on what
more democracy means will be a statement in the genre of
ideology or partisanship, a claim about what a given author
and those who share his or her politics would like democratic
politics to look like, not a claim about what scholarly analysis
can define democratic politics as necessarily consisting in.
I have argued that even the idea that democracy needs
agreement on formal “rules of the game” is superficially
obvious but in fact wrong. If we want to compare
democracy to a game—a common and natural metaphor,
though nobody thinks it is “only” a game—then different
spectators can disagree over how the game should best be
played, which game precisely is being played, or the degree
to which settled rules of the game are desirable in the first
place. (To take a few examples: we cannot determine
objectively or analytically whether the object of politics is
primarily to arrive at just laws or primarily to broker and
reconcile social interests; whether the best democracy is
one that stresses dutiful respect for democratic decisions or
one that practices vigorous and vocal, though peaceful,
dissent from them; or whether the proper model for
democratic aspiration is the French Revolution, the more
decentralized and libertarian American version, the direct
democracy of Athens and some Swiss cantons, or some-
thing else.) These disagreements are often tractable in
practice, though less so in theory. But even judging
democratic regimes by their degree of “democratic-ness”
is, if taken seriously, at least partly an exercise in normative
evaluation, in contestable moral judgment, rather than
merely measurement.
I have therefore suggested that we regard any attempt to
rate democracies on a single scale as a simplifying
assumption: invaluable for social science (which cannot
progress without agreed terms) but inevitably false to the
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permanent variety of conceptions of what the democratic
game should look like. This is in no way to disparage the
social scientist’s enterprise, nor the assumptions that it
requires to get going. In particular, simplifying assumptions
are essential if scholars are to play the role that Samuel
Huntington called “democratic Machiavelli”: that of the
social scientist who has a deep, well-grounded, and useful
knowledge of how democracy can be achieved and
maintained, knowledge that goes beyond what politicians
or citizens can gain through personal experience. But we
should not confuse the simplifying assumption with reality.
The search for a single definition even of what makes
regimes democratic will fail to do justice to everyday
processes of political debate and moral evaluation, in which
disagreement over what constitutes democracy results not
from ignorance or unreasonableness but from the natural
and desirable diversity of human opinions. A true and
permanent consensus on such questions is not at all
necessary. Viable governance only requires that the
current form of the regime be regarded as authoritative,
not necessarily as good. Democracy in Australia func-
tions perfectly well even though many citizens, while
recognizing the laws produced by the current constitution
as legitimate, think a unicameral legislature and a unitary
rather than a federal system would be better—and
democracy in New Zealand functions perfectly well the
other way around.
If agreement on what counts as a democratic regime is
neither possible or necessary in democratic life, agreement on
what counts as a substantively good democratic outcome, an
instantiation of democracy’s purpose, is even less possible and
even less necessary—even more thoroughly a question within
democratic politics, not above it. In other work I have stressed
the difference between the core and ideal civic virtues. The
first are actually and literally required for any liberal
democracy to function: tolerance, nonviolence, and a kind of
democratic sportsmanship that distinguishes between one’s
own desire to win the game and the broader commitments
required to keep the game going. The second are required only
on partisan or ideological conceptions of how democracies
ought to function, of what enables them to “thrive”—in the
sense of approaching closer to some goal or quality favored
by the speaker—rather than merely survive. That a given
criterion represents an innovative or unexpected way of
defining democracy’s purpose more or less guarantees that it
represents an ideal, not part of the core. The obvious criteria
for democracy are in some sense the only legitimate ones, for
all others will be contested by some large and reasonable
group of citizens—and democracy requires that we not
arbitrarily discount such denials.
Thus attachment to procedural criteria for measuring
democracies, criteria themselves necessarily imperfect and
simplified, does not reflect a cowardly refusal to consider
substantive criteria. It reflects on the contrary a principled
and well-founded conviction that the test of a good
democracy is its ability to function amidst disagreement
on substantive criteria. If all reasonable people could
agree on “a theory of the purpose of democracy,” we
would not suddenly understand democracy. We would
suddenly fail to need democracy. In fact, we would have
cause to worry if there were no persistent disagreement
on these matters. For that would mean that citizens had
come—falsely—to believe that arguments over the many
incompatible goods democratic procedures can embody
(liberty as well as effective government, welfare and
consensus as well as regional and ethnic diversity) had been
settled once and for all.
To be sure, it is easy to praise diversity in the
abstract while ignoring the costs of embracing it. A
concrete example may illustrate some practical benefits
as well. Ringen lists “trust in government” as a criterion
for good democratic functioning, presumably on the
basis of more being better. But this should be
challenged. Most would place the best level of trust
somewhere between zero and infinity: too little, and
government cannot enforce its decisions; too much, and
no citizen will stand against the government in defense
of liberty or justice. Even this moderate stance could be
challenged. Those who focus their attention on the evil
that modern states do rather than the goods they provide
often regard the right level of trust as close to zero—a
position not uncommon among political theorists in the
United States (e.g. followers of Sheldon Wolin) or
others for whom the Vietnam War was their formative
experience of state power. That position may be
eccentric now. But the few who keep it alive can be
of great value in times and places where the right stance
towards government is in fact not trust but radical
opposition. The phrase “eternal vigilance is the price of
liberty” is sometimes attributed to Thomas Jefferson, but
wrongly. Its actual author, who spoke with good reason,
given his times and his focus, was Wendell Phillips, the
abolitionist.
Politics, Waldron has compellingly argued, arises not out
of a consensus about justice or democracy but out of a “felt
need among the members of a certain group for a common
framework or decision or course of action on some matter,
even in the face of disagreement about what that framework,
decision or action should be.” The reasons for expecting this
disagreement to be permanent are themselves the subject of
disagreement. Waldron himself radicalizes John Rawls’
account of the “burdens of judgment”: the complexities of
the world, and the variety of standpoints that arise from our
divergent social and cultural positions in it, guarantee that a
variety of reasonable positions will persist not only on matters
of the ultimate good (as Rawls thought) but also on matters of
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justice and basic constitutional principle. Others might stress
instead—what Waldron does not deny either—the Berlinian
point that political disagreement is permanent because so
many things in the world are both good and incompatible;
reasonable people will always differ in how they weigh the
necessary tradeoffs. Either way, politics must start by
assuming permanent disagreement, not an allegedly “well-
ordered” consensus. Even if we were to posit an algorithm for
evaluating our diverse judgments of democratic purposes (a
theory of measurement, perhaps), we would be barred from
using it by democratic respect: the fact that others are entitled
to their own opinions and might not recognize a requirement
to defer to my algorithm or yours. Waldron astutely echoes
Arendt on this point: in politics, what appears in public debate
is never the truth but only an opinion or belief about the truth.
It is odd to aim at a theory of democratic purpose when
democracy only exists because we permanently disagree
about our political purposes. Trying to measure the health
of democracy by assuming away disagreement on questions
of autonomy, security, freedom, welfare, and the relative
importance of our own generation vis-à-vis future ones is
like trying to measure economic prosperity by assuming
away scarcity. That both projects are perennial does not
make either one less quixotic.
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